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Abstract
Suppose individuals get utilities from the total amount of wealth they hold and from their wealth relative
to those immediately below them. This paper studies the distribution of wealth that maximizes an additive
welfare function made up of these utilities. It interprets wealth distribution in a control theory framework
to show that the welfare maximizing distribution may have unexpected properties. In some circumstances
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Introduction

Social scientists often study the question of the optimal distribution of wealth in terms of an aggregate
welfare function in which individuals derive satisfaction from their own holdings of wealth independently
of the holdings of others. There is an increasing body of literature, particularly that concerned with
happiness and feelings of well being, that argues it is a mistake to construct models on the assumption
that the utilities, or satisfaction, of individuals are completely independent. It has been argued, for example, that the satisfaction individuals derive from things like wealth, income and what they purchase may
depend on relative rather than absolute holdings. This paper explores some implications of this argument.
The argument that satisfaction is relative has been made by Marx and Keynes among others and was
developed at length by Veblen [7] and, more recently by Hirsch [3]. Frey and Stutzer find, for example,
that there is little correlation between happiness and increases in absolute income and that ’it is not
the absolute level of income that matters most, but rather one’s position relative to other people’ ([2],
9). Easterling [1] argues that happiness increases with relative income but not with absolute income.
The same argument has been made for the satisfaction derived from the consumption of positional goods
like housing, education and luxury cars. Since happiness is relative to the holdings of others it is also
possible, of course, that a poorer person could get greater total happiness than a richer person, in some
circumstances. This seems to be one of the points that the ’wealth does not buy happiness’ argument is
attempting to make. What happens if we try to build some notion of relative satisfaction into our wealth
distribution models? What sort of distribution would maximize welfare? In what way would the well
known distribution with independent utilities change?
The first question that might be asked about the argument that the satisfaction from wealth is relative
to the holdings of others is, relative to whose holdings? Frey and Stutzer give evidence to show that
the reference group is people with the same labour market characteristics and that the better this group
is doing relatively to an individual, the less happy this individual becomes ([2], p.9). One interesting
possible explanation is that, although people may look up and feel envious, they also look down and wish
to retain their traditional privileges and position. Individuals may care more about how much better
they are doing relative to those immediately below than they care how they are doing relative to those
above. There are a number of plausible reasons for this. Hirsh, for example, sees the problem of relative
satisfaction in terms of the conditions of use. The greater the number of people who have access to some
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goods the less the satisfaction there is from consuming them ([3], p.2). He says that it is the ability of an
individual to improve its position by moving to a higher place in the queue that counts ([3], p.7). This
is persuasive. It may also be the case, however, that individuals are even more worried about retaining
the advantage they already have in access to positional goods like housing, travel and prestigious items
of consumption. This advantage may be defined, or at least most felt, in comparison to their immediate
reference group. That is, individuals may want to feel that their status and advantage, compared to their
group is secure. As an extension of this, they may get more pain from slipping down the scale relative to
those who have been below than they get from an improvement in the position of those who have been
traditionally better-off. Unlike envy, which depends on wanting what others have, this is a desire not to
lose what one already has, in a relative sense.1 In other words if not being able to move up in the queue
is bad, having someone push in front may be even worse.
In order to capture the notion that individuals are concerned with maintaining status and offsetting
insecurity in this manner it will be assumed that the difference between the wealth they hold relative to
those below them is more important than the amount they hold relative to those above them. This means
that for a fixed amount of wealth the utility of an individual will decrease as the distance between its
wealth and those immediately below decreases. This might be thought of as a neighbourhood affect. As
more individuals move into the wealth neighbourhood from below the greater becomes the competition
for scarce goods. This is not exactly the same as someone pushing in front in the queue but the outcome
will be similar. Its utility will also decrease as those immediately above move further away. It is assumed,
however that the loss of security from having its neighbourhood crowded from below is greater than the
loss of aspirations resulting from an increase in the relative wealth of those who are better off. In this
respect concerns about security are more important than aspirations.
It should be noted that these effects only occur in the immediate neighbourhood of an individual’s
position. It is not assumed that the individuals have a preference for inequality or wish to be globally
better off than everyone else. What they are driven by is a sense of seeking local security.2
The specific purpose of this paper is to attempt to understand some of the consequences of this neighbourhood effect for the distribution of wealth. In order to do this we explore the distribution that would
be chosen by a welfare maximizing despot.
We want to study this question in the most straightforward manner possible in order to highlight
the effect of these assumptions about utilities on distribution. To this end we assume that the welfare
function is additive and that the only constraint is that it should respect a smoothness condition that
prevents arbitrary jumps between individuals.
Among the most interesting findings of the study is that a desire for relative wealth may require a
distribution that maximizes inequality at the bottom and the top end of wealth holdings. Although an
inegalitarian outcome is not a surprise, this particular pattern is not what might be expected. It is also
found that, under less plausible but also fairly mild assumptions, the smoothness condition cannot be
met at all and the optimal distribution requires all wealth to be given to one individual.
1 See [6] p.239-46 for a discussion of envy. Not wanting to lose a position may be a less objectionable normative claim
than one based on envy.
2 This idea is similar in spirit to Schelling’s work on micro-motives [4].
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We set out the paper as follows. The model is developed in §2. The main theory is presented in §3.
In §4 we briefly discuss the results.
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The distribution problem

Suppose a benevolent despot wishes to distribute a fixed amount of wealth among a large number of
individuals in order to maximize an additive welfare function. The distribution is anonymous in the sense
that the despot does not discriminate between individuals. The despot would also like this distribution to
satisfy some ideal smoothness condition that limits the rate of change in wealth holding across individuals.
The motivation for this condition depends on intuitions we might have about treatment of individuals.
These are that abrupt changes between individuals seem to be arbitrary, in some sense. If an unequal
distribution is required it should, ideally, respect individuals by not making a jump between those that
are adjacent in the distribution. Such a jump would seem to introduce an extreme inegalitarianism that,
somehow, treats similar cases in a different manner. This smoothness condition is specified more precisely
below. It is an ideal constraint in the sense that it will be met if possible, but it can be violated if this
is necessary to make an optimal distribution.
The utility function for each individual depends on the amount of wealth it holds and the distance
from those above and below in the immediate neighbourhood. It is assumed that utility increases with
an increase in the distance between the wealth holdings of an individual and those in the neighbourhood
below and also with a decrease in the distance from those in the neighbourhood above. To get some
intuition on this we might imagine, for example, that there is a pre-existing distribution and that utility
will decrease for individuals if those immediately below begin to catch up.
The way in which utility changes as differences in wealth between an individual and those in a near
neighbourhood change might be thought of in the context of a large number of individuals in terms of
the rate of change of wealth in a neighbourhood. This means that the faster the rate of change from
those below the higher the utility. Peter Skott has pointed out that this means a poorer person could get
more utility than a richer person in some circumstances.3 A similar situation occurs in any model that
constructs a utility function with wealth and relative position as separate arguments. Although this could
possibly be avoided by a more complicated model it is taken here as reflecting the logic of the position,
mentioned in the previous section, that wealth is not the only determinant of happiness. If this outcome
were to be seen as unreasonable the argument would have to be modified to say that a poorer person
could never be happier than a richer person. This seems to be inconsistent with what we are trying to
capture.
i
The model is constructed by representing each individual as a point n+1
in (0, 1), where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Individuals are placed in sequence in increasing order of wealth and the wealth given to the individual at
i
i
i
is x̃( n+1
). Let x(t) be a piecewise-continuously differentiable function interpolating x̃( n+1
).
point n+1

The utility that the individual at t =
3 Private

i
n+1

gets from wealth, without reference to relative holdings, is

correspondence with one of the authors.
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f (x(t)) where f : R → R is twice continuously differentiable. Assume that
d2 f
d2 f
dx2 < 0 everywhere, or dx2 = 0 everywhere.

df
dx

> 0 everywhere and either

i
The utility that the individual at t = n+1
gets from the rate at which wealth holding changes, relative
i−1
i
) − x( n+1
)). In order to account for the way in which
to those below, is written δ(x(t)) ≡ (n + 1)(x( n+1
utilities change with different rates of change in wealth, the utility function is written b̄(δ(x(t)))a where
a, b̄ > 0. The exponent a determines the marginal value to the individual at t of changes in the rate of
increase of wealth. For a < 1 there are declining marginal returns and for a > 1 there are increasing
marginal returns. There will be an analogous expression for the change in utility as the rate of change in
wealth relative to those above alters. This is written c̄(δ(x(t)))a

Since the despot is maximizing an additive welfare function, we can treat the problem as that of maxi
, over [0, 1] with
imizing the Riemann sum of f (x(t)) + b̄(δ(x(t)))a − c̄(δ(x(t)))a , evaluated at t = n+1
P
i=n
2i+1
i
2i−1
1
)) +
a partition κ = κ1 , . . . κn where κi = ( 2(n+1) , 2(n+1) ). This sum is written R0 = i=1 (f (x( n+1
R
1
i
a
b(δ(x( n+1 )) )κi where b = b̄ − c̄ and b > 0. For n sufficiently large, we can make sup | 0 (f (x(t) +
a
1
b( dx(t)
dt ) )dt − R0 | as small as we wish.
Then the despot’s problem is that of distributing wealth to maximize
J=

Z

1

(f (x(t)) + bẋ(t)a )dt

(1)

0

subject to
Z

1

x(t)dt = 1

(2)

0

where (2) captures the assumption that wealth is fixed.
In order to meet the ideal smoothness constraint on the level of permissible inequality the rate of
change in wealth distribution is restricted to give
0 ≤ ẋ(t) ≤ m

(3)

for some m > 0 and all t. The initial level of wealth x(0) is to be determined. With constraints (2) and
(3) given we want to focus on the properties of the distribution and do not prohibit negative wealth.
Note that the properties of the optimum distribution are not at all obvious. It might be instructive to
try and guess the nature of the distribution on the basis of (1), (2), and (3). Would the problem actually
have a solution? Would it be a convex or concave curve? Would it increase the wealth for the poorest
individual as quickly as possible and then give an egalitarian distribution? Would it leave a group of
individuals at zero and accelerate wealth for the rest as quickly as possible?
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The main theorem and optimal distribution.

The main results are set out in Theorem 1 for different possibilities on the utility function for wealth
and the value of the exponent a. Of these the most interesting is for the case where marginal returns
4

to wealth are declining and a < 1. When a < 1 the utility individuals get from the rate of change in
wealth in their neighbourhood is declining and this means that as the distance between their wealth and
those immediately below increases the utility they get from this becomes less. This is consistent with the
interpretation of this rate of change as a proxy for security. In this case wealth is either distributed at
a maximum rate across all individuals, or for some values of a and b, wealth is distributed to maximize
inequality at the bottom and the top end of the wealth distribution. This result is something of a surprise
and difficult to explain intuitively. It is illustrated in fig. 1.
In the case where a > 1 and utilities are increasing as the rate of change in the neighbourhood increases, the despot either distributes at the maximum rate across all individuals or there is no solution
that maximizes welfare under the ideal constraint. In this case the despot distributes all wealth to one
individual. This is something of a surprise since the marginal utility of wealth is declining. What is
happening here is that small neighbourhood desires whereby everyone wants to be a little better off than
those below produce an outcome where everybody is no better off than anyone else, with the exception of
a single individual. In this sense the desire to be a little better off produces a form of distribution paradox.

Theorem 1 The optimal rate of distribution is:
2
[a] for ddxf2 = 0 everywhere, ẋ(t) = m for all t ∈ [0, 1];
2
[b] for ddxf2 < 0 everywhere and 0 < a < 1, there exists an α, β with 0 < α ≤ β < 1 such that ẋ(t) = m
for all t in the intervals [0, α) ∪ (β, 1] and ẋ(t) < m for all t in the interval (α, β);
2
[c] for ddxf2 < 0 everywhere and a ≥ 1 either, ẋ(t) = m for all t, or ẋ(t) = 0, for all t ∈ [0, 1).
In part [c] the last result means that there is no optimal distribution that satisfies (3) and the despot can
do no better than give all wealth to one individual.

Figure 1. Example of optimal wealth distribution for a < 1.
Proof. The proof uses the Pontryagin maximum principle ([5] p.103 - 33) and in order to get the problem
in an appropriate form begin by defining
ẋ(t) = u(t)
where u(t) is to be chosen to solve the problem (1) - (3). u(t) is required to be measurable, for example
piecewise continuous, almost everywhere. To save notation the condition almost everywhere is taken as
given in what follows. Now define a new variable w(t) such that
ẇ(t) = x(t)
with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1 in order to satisfy (2).
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From the Pontryagin principle, the necessary conditions for a measurable function u∗ that solves (1)
- (3) to exist are that u = u∗ maximizes the Hamiltonian
H = f (x(t)) +

u(t)a
+ λ(t)u(t) + ζ(t)x(t)
a

(4)

where b has been set at a1 to simplify the notation without any loss of generality and λ(t) and ζ(t), are
continuous functions of t. In addition

λ̇(t) = −

df
|x∗ (t) −ζ(t)
dx

ζ̇(t) = 0

(5)
(6)

where x∗ (t) is the optimal path. It is also necessary that the transversality conditions λ(0) = 0, λ(1) = 0
be satisfied. Note that ζ is constant for all t. Differentiating λ̇(t) gives
λ̈(t) = −

d2 f
|x∗ (t) ẋ∗ (t) ≥ 0
dx2

(7)

Remarks.
1. It follows from (7) and the transversality conditions that λ(t) ≤ 0 always.
2. Since f is continuous and ζ is continuous λ̇ is continuous.
It is now necessary to consider the possibilities for f (x) and different values of a. In what follows the
constraint (3) is assumed in force.
2

Proof of [a]. ddxf2 is identically 0.
In this case the Hamiltonian gives ∂H
∂u > 0 for all u(t) > 0 and all a > 0 since λ(t) = 0 for all t from (7).
∗
Hence u (t) = m for all a > 0 and all t ∈ [0, 1].
2

Proof of [b]. ddxf2 < 0 for all x and 0 < a < 1.
2
In this case ∂H
∂u2 < 0. Hence the necessary and sufficient condition for u(t) to maximize (4) is
u∗ (t) = min{m, (−λ(t))1/(a−1) }
1
(a−1)

(8)

Note that (−λ(t))
→ ∞ as λ(t) → 0. From the transversality conditions and the continuity of λ̇(t)
1
(a−1)
> m in intervals [0, α) and (β, 1] for some 0 < α ≤ β < 1 with α sufficiently small
we have (−λ(t))
1
6 ∅ and
and β sufficiently near 1. This is illustrated in fig. 2. Suppose that T ≡ {t : (−λ(t)) (a−1) < m} =
∗
define α ≡ inf T and β ≡ sup T . We show that u (t) < m for t ∈ (α, β) by assuming that u(t) = m for
some t = tk ∈ (α, β) and arguing by contradiction. Since u(t) > 0 for all t, λ(t) has a single turning point
by (7), and this means that sup T ≤ tk . This contradicts the definition of β. This means that either:
(i). u∗ (t) = m for all t ∈ [0, 1]
or
(ii). u∗ (t) = m for all t ∈ [0, c) ∪ (d, 1] and u∗ (t) < m for t ∈ (α, β).
2

Proof of [c]. ddxf2 < 0 for all x and a ≥ 1.
The term to be maximized in (4) can be written
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u(t)(
and, since

∂2H
∂u2

≥ 0, the necessary and sufficient condition for u = u∗ to maximize (4) is

u∗ (t) =
where p =

u(t)a−1
+ λ(t))
a

m for λ(t) > −p
0 for λ(t) < −p

(9)

ma−1
a .

1

Figure 2. Examples of ̟ = (−λ(t)) (a−1)
From the transversality conditions and the continuity of λ(t) we have λ(t) > −p for t ∈ [0, r) ∪ (s, 1] for
0 < r ≤ s < 1 and r sufficiently small and s sufficiently close to 1. Hence there are two possibilities:
1. λ(t) > −p for all t.
Then u∗ (t) = m for all t ∈ [0, 1].
2. λ(t) ≤ −p for some 0 < t < 1.
Then M ≡ {t : λ(t) ≤ −p} 6= ∅. Set r ≡ inf M and note that, since limt→r− λ(t) ≥ −p, we have
λ(r) = −p. From (9) u∗ (t) = m in [0, r), if there is a solution that satisfies (3). We want to show that
λ̇ < 0 in [0, r). Since λ(0) = 0 and λ(r) = −p, and λ̈(t) > 0 for all t < r this will be true if there no
turning point in [0, r). Suppose there is a turning point at tq < r. Since the turning point is unique in
[0, r), λ̇(tk ) > 0 whenever tq < tk < r. Since λ(tq ) > −p, λ(tk ) > −p and λ(r) > −p. This contradicts
λ(r) = −p. This gives us two cases to consider:
2.i. λ̇(r) = 0.
The aim here is to show that u∗ (t) = m, for all t, by comparing values of H. Start by supposing λ(t) > −p
for t ∈ (r, r + ǫ) for some small ǫ > 0. Then u∗ (t) = m. This means that the value of the Hamiltonian at
r + δ for any 0 < δ ≤ ǫ is
ϕ = f (x(r + δ)) + m(p + λ(r + δ)) + ζx(r + δ)
where x(r + δ)) > x(r) and p + λ(r + δ) > 0.
Suppose now λ(t) < −p for t ∈ (r, r + ǫ) where ǫ > 0. Then u∗ (t) = 0. This means that ẋ = 0 for all
t ∈ (r, r + ǫ) and the value of the Hamiltonian is
ϕ̃ = f (x(r)) + ζx(r)
7

From (6) ζ is a constant. Since x(r + δ)) > x(r) and df /dx > 0, we have ϕ > ϕ̃. Therefore u(t) = m
maximizes (4) for all t ∈ (r, r + ǫ), which is a contradiction.
Now consider t > r + ǫ. The fact that λ̇(t) > 0 for all t ∈ (r, r + ǫ) means that λ(r + ǫ) > λ(r) = −p.
Because λ̈(t) ≥ 0 from (7), and r is the unique turning point, λ̇(t) > 0 for all t > r + ǫ. Hence λ(t) > −p
for all t > r + ǫ. It follows that u(t) = m for all t ∈ (r + ǫ, 1]. Hence u∗ (t) = m for all t > r.
2.ii. λ̇(r) < 0.
In this case we show that there is no solution that satisfies the transversality conditions. Since λ̇(r) < 0,
for some ǫ > 0, λ̇(t) < 0 for t ∈ [r, r + ǫ) so W ≡ {q > r : λ̇(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [r, q)} =
6 ∅. The mean
value theorem gives λ̇(s) − λ̇(r) = λ̈(t̃)(s − r) for some r < tk < s. Since s = supW , λ̇(t) < 0 for all
t ∈ [r, s) and λ(tk ) < λ(r) = −p. Therefore u(t) = 0 and λ̈(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [r, s). Hence λ̇(s) − λ̇(r) = 0
and λ̇(s) < 0. So λ̇(q) < 0 for q ∈ [s, s + ǭ) for some ǭ > 0, hence for all q ∈ [r, s + ǭ). Therefore
s = sup W ≥ s + ǭ > s and this contradiction proves s = 1. This means λ̇(t) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [r, 1) and,
since λ(r) = −p we must have λ(1) ≤ −p. This contradicts λ(1) = 0.
R1
R1
a
For the case where there is no measurable u that satisfies (3), consider J = 0 f (x(t))dt + 0 ẋ(t)
dt.
a
R1
R 1 ẋ(t)a
Observe that, for a ≥ 1 and ẋ > K sufficiently large, we have 0 a dt ≥ 0 ẋ(t)dt = x(1) − x(0). Since
f (0) = 0, J can be made arbitrarily large by setting x(0) = 0 and ẋ > K arbitrarily large to give x(1)
arbitrarily large. Consider the control

u(t) =

0 for t ∈ [0, 1 − ǫ)
k for t ∈ (1 − ǫ, 1]

(10)

where ǫ > 0 and k > K. For a = 1 we must have ǫk = 1 in order to meet (2) and we can consider k as
an implicit function of ǫ. Because ǫ is not bounded away from 0, and dk(ǫ)
dǫ < 0, there is no upper bound
for k. This means that there is no measurable u(t) that maximizes (4) and the despot must violate (3)
and give all wealth to the individual at 1.

4

Conclusion.

This paper has attempted to explore some of the consequences of the idea that the happiness an individual gets from wealth is relative to the holdings of other individuals. In particular it has been assumed
that individuals are mostly concerned with their security and status relative to those immediately below.
This concern has been modelled in terms of rates of change in wealth in the neighbourhood of each
individual.
It was shown that if the marginal utility of wealth is decreasing and the exponent a < 1 there are
some parameters for which the welfare maximizing distribution will have the property that the rate
of change in inequality is maximized at the richest and poorest ends but tends to be egalitarian in the
middle. This is the most interesting case since it has the most plausible story about the nature of individual utilities. It roughly give a profile in which there are some very poor, a flat middle, and some very rich.
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In other cases it was shown that either the rate of change in wealth is at the maximum rate or all the
wealth goes to a single individual. In the latter case we have a situation in which a desire amongst all to
be slightly better-off locally may result in a situation where all, but one, individual is not to better-off
in the optimal allocation. This might be thought ot as a paradox of individual desires and collective
outcomes. it may also be pointing at some form of collective inconsistency in individual desires for inequality, no matter how local.
In order to highlight the effects of a desire to secure position relative to those below no attempt has
been made to soften the analysis by introducing other factors. Nonetheless, to the extent that this desire
exists, these findings may help explain why there has not been a stronger demand for wealth equalizing
programmes in affluent societies.
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